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Extensive researches have been dedicated to investigating the performance of real networks and
synthetic networks against random failures or intentional attack guided by degree (degree attack).
Degree is one of straightforward measures to characterize the vitality of a vertex in maintaining the
integrity of the network but not the only one. Damage, the decrease of the largest component size
that was caused by the removal of a vertex, intuitively is a more destructive guide for intentional
attack on networks since the network functionality is usually measured by the largest component size.
However, it is surprising to find that little is known about behaviors of real networks or synthetic
networks against intentional attack guided by damage (damage attack), in which adversaries always
choose the vertex with the largest damage to attack.
In this article, we dedicate our efforts to understanding damage attack and behaviors of real
networks as well as synthetic networks against this attack. To this end, existing attacking models,
statistical properties of damage in complex networks are first revisited. Then, we present the
empirical analysis results about behaviors of complex networks against damage attack with the
comparisons to degree attack. It is surprising to find a cross-point for diverse networks before
which damage attack is more destructive than degree attack. Further investigation shows that the
existence of cross-point can be attributed to the fact that: degree attack tends produce networks
with more heterogenous damage distribution than damage attack. Results in this article strongly
suggest that damage attack is one of most destructive attacks and deserves our research efforts.
Our understandings about damage attack may also shed light on efficient solutions to protect real
networks against damage attack.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, great efforts have been dedicated
to the research on the resilience of real-world networks
or synthetic networks against random failures or inten-
tional attacks [1–14]. Random failure can be considered
as a special case of intentional attack when no informa-
tion of vertex importance in the sense of maintaining
the integrity of the network is available to an adversary.
If certain structural information of the network is avail-
able, a rational adversary generally tends to select the
most important vertex to attack so that the destructive
effect can be maximized. Usually, the attack will con-
tinue step by step until the adversary believes that the
desired destructive objective is achieved.
Thus, from an adversary’s perspective, ranking the im-
portance of vertex in the network is one of the fundamen-
tal steps towards destructing the network. A real network
can be precisely modeled as a graph G(V,E), where V
represents the entities in the network and E represents
relations among these entities. A variety of measures
are available to rank the vertex importance in a graph.
Among them, degree and betweenness, have been widely
investigated in previous researches about network robust-
ness [6, 10]. Degree quantifies the number of connections
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to a vertex. Vertices with large degrees dominate the
connections of the whole network, thus are naturally re-
garded as the most important vertex in maintaining the
integrity of the network. Betweenness counts the fraction
of shortest paths going through a given vertex. Hence,
vertex with high betweenness is important in maintaining
the communication functionality of the network [15–17].
In general, vertex importance can be measured from
different perspectives. However, except degree and be-
tweenness, many of others have been rarely investigated
in the research about network robustness. One of them
is damage, which characterizes the damage caused by
the removal of a vertex and usually is quantified as the
decrease of the largest component size when the vertex
and its incident edges are removed. Intuitively, a vertex
causing large damage leads to more destructive effect on
the network performance. Damage plays a vital role in
characterizing the essentiality of components in biologi-
cal networks. Vertices (proteins or enzymes) that cause
large damage are essential or important in protein inter-
action networks or metabolic networks [18, 19].
By definition, attacking the target node with the max-
imal damage causes the most significant damage on the
given network than any other attack if destructive ef-
fect is measured by damage. We use a hypothetical
graph shown in Figure 1 to illustrate the destructive ef-
fect caused by attacking vertex of highest damage. In
this graph, vertex u1 has damage value 4. The removal
of u1 will isolate four vertex from the major component
2FIG. 1: (Color online) Damage attack on a hypothetical net-
work. The two yellow vertex are the top two vertex of the
largest damages, which are 4 and 3, respectively. The two red
vertex are the top two vertex of the largest degrees, which are
8 and 7, respectively.
of the network. However, if we remove the vertex with
the largest degree, i.e., vertex v1, no vertex except itself
will be isolated from the major component. This exam-
ple clearly shows that attack guided by damage or simply
damage attack (that is always attacking the vertex with
highest damage) yields non-trivial destructive effect.
Despite of its destructive effect caused by damage at-
tack, the fundamental characteristics of damage attack
and the response of real networks as well as synthetic
networks to damage attack has been rarely studied so far.
In this article, we systematically investigate damage at-
tack and the performance of real networks and synthetic
networks including Barabas´i-Albert (BA) [20] networks
and Erdo¨s-Re´ny (ER) [21] networks against damage at-
tack. Across the study, attack guided by degree is also
investigated as a comparison.
The structure of the remainder of this article is as fol-
lows: we first review existing attacking model aiming at
unifying existing attack models in Section II. Then, in
Section III, we systematically investigate statistical prop-
erties about damage, damage distribution, correlation
between damage and degree. In Section IV, we present
the empirical analysis results about the behaviors of real
networks and synthetic networks against damage attack
with the comparison to degree attack, finding that there
exists a cross-point before which damage attack is more
destructive than degree attack. Such findings are further
explained in Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we briefly
summarize major findings and results that we get in this
article.
II. ATTACKING MODELS
A variety of intentional attacking models have been im-
plicitly studied in previous researches. Despite of their
distinctive features, they share the same framework to
describe themselves. In general, we need to specify the
ranking mechanisms of vertex importance and perfor-
mance measure of networks to clarify an attacking model.
In this section, we will first present a unified attacking
model by synthesizing existing models, and then give a
brief overview of vertex importance ranking and network
functionality measures.
A. Unified attacking model
An attacking strategy describes the way that an adver-
sary issues attacks on the network. In this paper, we are
particularly interested in intentional attack, since inten-
tional attack is more destructive than random attack or
random failures [2–4, 7]. In an intentional attack, an ad-
versary preferentially attacks the vertex that he believes
is important for maintaining integrity of the network to
maximize the destructive effect. In contrast, in a random
attack or random failure, adversaries choose the attack
target by purely random guess or each vertex or edge fails
with equal probability.
Among intentional attacks, we only consider vertex at-
tack, that is, attacking a network by removing a vertex
as well as its incident edges from the network. Some
conclusions can be directly extended to edge attack, i.e.,
just removing an edge. It’s reasonable to assume that the
objective of an adversary to attack a network is to max-
imize the destructive effect by attacking fixed number of
vertices. For this purpose, an adversary first need to as-
sess the ’benefits’ by attacking an vertex. This problem
is equivalent to evaluate the importance of a vertex for
maintaining the integrity of the network. Hence, rank-
ing mechanisms of vertex importance becomes a core of
devising an attacking strategy. In general, different ad-
versaries will rank the vertex importance from different
aspects, producing disparate destructive effects. For ex-
ample, the vertex importance can be measured by degree,
betweenness, damage or many others.
Suppose the adversaries are empowered with the abil-
ity to identify the most important vertex, he generally
will follow a greedy framework to maximize the destruc-
tive effect, that is always attacking the most important
vertex of the remaining network at each step until he be-
lieves that the desired destructive effect is achieved. This
is the framework of attack model that will be investigated
in this paper.
Note that in above attacking model, we make two
strong assumptions. The first is that adversaries can al-
ways select the most important vertex. The second is
that adversaries have the ability to issue continuous at-
tacks. Such strongest assumptions are quite meaningful
since protection solution based on the understanding of
the network robustness behavior against the worst attack
comes with safety guarantee. In many real cases, adver-
saries can hardly select the most important vertex since
only local information about the network is available to
adversaries [22]. On the hand, adversaries usually have
limited resources to issue continuous attack. Hence, in
real cases the networks preform better than we expected
under the strongest assumption.
Another key element of an attacking model is the quan-
tification of network performance or functionality. The
3characterization of the robustness of networks is deter-
mined by performance measures. For example, the ro-
bustness of network can be investigated by observing
the change of the largest component size (Smax) of the
network when the network is subject to continuous at-
tacks [7, 23]. Fast decrease of Smax provides strong evi-
dence for the vulnerability of the network. The network
performance can also be measured from other aspects,
e.g., the communication functionality, which are usually
measured by the average shortest path length or network
diameter. In general, when measured from different as-
pects, a network usually exhibits diverse robustness be-
haviors.
Hence, generally, an attacking model can be described
by a triple (α, τ,F), where α is the functionality mea-
sure, τ captures the most important vertex as the attack-
ing target and F is an indicator function that indicates
whether the attacking objective is achieved. Let Gt be
the remaining network after t steps of attack, then the
attacking procedure specified by (α, τ, F ) generally can
be described as follows: At each attacking step, τ(Gt) as
well as its incident edges are removed from Gt. Repeat
the attack until α(Gt) satisfies the assertion specified by
F .
In most previous researches, when α(G) is the largest
component size of a network, F is assumed to be α(Gt) =
0, or α(Gt) ≈ 0. In cases where F is clear in the context,
we usually represent an attacking model by (α, τ). Note
that, in the proposed attacking model, τ(Gt) is always
calculated from Gt instead of G0, which means we always
recalculate the vertex importance and select one of the
most important from the network after attack instead of
the original network. The rationality lies in the fact that
most measures of vertex are sensitive to vertex removal.
However, when attack is guided by degree, removing ver-
tex with the highest degree has limited influence on the
degree rank of remaining vertex. Hence, we can use the
degree rank of the original network to approximate that
of the network after attack.
Under the attack specified by (α, τ), the robustness of
a network G, denoted by r(G)t, can be explicitly defined
as:
r(G)t =
|α(G0)− α(Gt)|
t
(1)
, which is the ratio of network performance decrease to
the number of removed vertex. From the viewpoint of
adversaries, it characterizes the efficiency of an attack
strategy.
B. Measures of network functionality
In the study of network robustness, a typical measure
of network functionality is the size of its largest connected
component (LCC) [7], i.e., Smax. In general, removing a
vertex from a connected network will detach some con-
nected subgraphs or isolated vertex from the largest com-
ponent of the network. Hence, Smax will decrease after
deleting a vertex. Then, the vulnerability or robustness
of a network can be evaluated by the change of Smax.
More larger the change of Smax is, more vulnerable the
network is. When we investigate damage attack, we will
use Smax as the major measure for network functionality.
Another class of network functionality measures is
based on the shortest path information of the network.
Shortest paths have been shown to be crucial for the
communication of a variety of real networks. Thus, pre-
serving the key statistics of shortest pathes, will be an
important indicator of resilience of the network against
vertex attack. One statistic over shortest paths in a net-
work G(V,E) is the average shortest path length, which
is usually defined as:
l =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
u,v∈V,u6=v
d(u, v) (2)
, where d(u, v) is the length of the shortest path from
vertex u to v. In a disconnected network, d(u, v) will
be infinite for two disconnected vertices u and v. To
overcome this problem, one can instead use the average
inverse geodesic length, which is
l−1 =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
u,v∈V,u6=v
1
d(u, v)
(3)
When attacking a network by removing vertices, the net-
work will eventually break into disconnected subgraphs.
Hence, l−1 as given in Equation 3 is also widely used to
measure network functionality. When performing con-
tinuous attack on a network, l−1 will decrease with the
increase of the number of removed vertex. Fast decrease
of l−1 strongly suggests that the network is vulnerable.
C. Ranking of vertex importance
A variety of vertex importance measures have been
proposed, among them, degree and betweenness are two
most widely used measures. Intuitively, vertices with
high degree, i.e. hub vertices, contribute significantly to
the interconnectedness of the whole network, thus is im-
portant with respect to maintaining the integrity of the
network. Vertex betweenness measures the number of
shortest paths passing through a vertex. Vertices with
high betweenness are believed to be crucial for informa-
tion/material transferring in many real networks such as
internet, power grid, where information or signals travels
from sources to destinations by shortest paths to save the
transfer cost. The vertex betweenness of a vertex u can
be formally defined as follows:
CB(u) =
∑
s6=u6=t∈V
σst(u)
σst
(4)
, where σst is the number of shortest paths between s
and t and σst(u) is the number of shortest paths in σst
that pass through u .
4One important issue about vertex ranking is its sensi-
tivity to the vertex removal operation. Clearly, ranking
by degree is less sensitive than ranking by betweenness
to vertex removals. Such a fact implies that recalcula-
tion on destructed networks is necessary for betweeness-
based ranking. In contrast, degree ranking in the original
network is quite close to that obtained by recalculating
on destructed networks. In general, adversaries need to
pay extra recalculation cost to perform attacks guided
by vertex ranking mechanisms that are sensitive to ver-
tex removals.
Computation cost is another critical concern when ad-
versaries attack a network consisting of millions of ver-
tex. Degree can be retrieved by constant time when the
graph is built in memory. The fast algorithm to compute
betweenness for all nodes requires O(NM) time for un-
weighted networks [24], where N,M are the vertex num-
ber and edge number, respectively. However, degrees of
all vertex can be counted in O(N + M) time. Hence,
considering computation cost, degree is preferred to be-
tweenness by adversaries. However, for small networks or
medium-sized networks of tens of thousands of vertices,
both degree and betweenness can be obtained by adver-
saries, which poses a great challenge for us to protect real
network systems.
III. DAMAGE OF NETWORKS
If the network functionality is measured by Smax, then
to maximize the destructive effect, a straightforward
greedy approach is to remove vertices one by one in the
descending order of their damage value. In this section,
we will systematically revisit vertex damage for real net-
works and synthetic networks.
A. Damage of graphs
Let G(V,E) be an undirected graph (not necessarily a
connected graph). The damage of a vertex v ∈ V , D(v)
is defined as Smax − S
′
max, where Smax and S
′
max are
the largest connected component size before removing v
and after removing v, respectively. For a vertex v in
a connected graph, its damage D(v) lies in the range
[1, N − 1][27]. D(v) is 1 when the induced subgraph of
V − {v} is a connected component. D(v) = N − 1 when
v is the central vertex of a star-like network (that is the
graph with N −1 vertex of degree 1 being connected to a
central vertex of degree N − 1). If the degree of v, d(v),
is given, a tighter upper bound of D(v) can be given by:
N −
N
d(v)
= N(1−
1
d(v)
) (5)
The upper bound is reachable when v connects to d(v)
clusters that have the same size and disconnect to each
other.
u
v
C1 C2
FIG. 2: Sensitivity of damage to vertex removal. C1 and C2
are two connected components, each of them has N−2
2
vertex.
Damage of vertices is sensitive to vertex deletion oper-
ation. For example, damages of u, v in the hypothetical
graph shown in Figure 2 are both 0. However, once one
of u, v is removed from the graph, the damage of the
other vertex will drastically increase approximately to
N/2. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that adversaries
tend to recalculate damage to maximize destructive ef-
fect.
Let’s have a closer look at vertex of different damage
values. In a connected graph, a vertex has a damage
value larger than 1 if and only if it is a cut of the graph,
which is a vertex whose removal will increase the number
of connected components. The vulnerability of a network
to vertex removal can be attributed to the existence of
these cuts. Vertex of damage 1 are those vertex v such
that the induced subgraph of V − {v} is connected. The
removal of anyone of these vertex will only isolate itself
from the largest component. Among one-damage ver-
tex, some of them are vertex of degree 1. Others in one-
damage vertex may have diverse degrees. Since removing
an one-damage vertex causes no extra damage to the net-
work, these vertex all also called vertex of trivial damage
in following texts.
Concepts of damage is closely related to connectiv-
ity of graphs. Given a connected graph G, its vertex-
connectivity, denoted κv(G) is the minimal number of
vertices whose removal will disconnect G or reduce it to
a 1-vertex graph. A graph G is k − connected if it is
connected and the κv(G) ≥ k. Thus, any graph with
κv(G) ≥ 2 will not contain vertex with damage larger
than 1. In other words, we can only find vertex of dam-
age larger than 1 from 1− connected networks.
B. Damage in synthetic networks
In this subsection, we will investigate vertex damage
in typical synthetic networks. One is BA networks, ac-
counting for a typical class of networks with scale-free
degree distribution. The second is ER networks, a typ-
ical network model producing exponential degree distri-
bution. Finally, trees and tree-like networks will also be
investigated.
The connectivity of BA networks depends on the con-
nectivity of it’s seed network and the number of vertex
(m ∈ N) that at each step a newly added vertex connect
5to. Note that when m = 2, each step of BA network gen-
eration is a path addition to the existing network, i.e.,
adding a path with internal vertex disjoint with the ex-
isting vertex to the network. Due to Whitney Synthesis
Theorem [25], the resulting network obtained by repeat-
edly performing path addition on a 2 − connected net-
work is still 2 − connected. Furthermore, a network is
still 2 − connected if it is obtained by adding edges to
a 2 − connected network. Hence, for BA models, if the
seed network is 2 − connected and m ≥ 2, the resulting
network is 2− connected. The direct consequence of this
fact is that the BA networks generated as above will not
contain vertex of non-trivial damage value.
An ER random network is generated on N vertices
by linking each pair of vertex with identical probability
0 < p < 1. The ER networks generated under parameters
N and p are usually denoted by G(N, p). Random graph
theory has shown us that for k > 0, almost every graph
is k-connected [26]. A graph property P is said to hold
for ’almost every graph’ if the probability that a random
graph G ∈ G(N, p) has property P has the limit 1 as
n → ∞. Thus, it’s hard to find vertices with non-trivial
damage from a large ER random graph. However, when p
is small and the network is not very large, the probability
that the network is not k − connected is significant.
Let u, v be any two vertices in a graph in G(N, p),
then other N − 2 vertex can be partitioned into ⌊(N −
2)/k⌋ k-subsets (a subset of k vertex), with perhaps a
fewer vertices left over. Let W be a k-subset. Then, the
probability that every vertex of W is adjacent to u and
v (i.e., W is fully-adjacent to {u, v}) is p2k. Hence, the
probability that none of these k-subsets is fully-adjacent
to {u, v} is
q = (1 − p2k)⌊(
N−2
k
)⌋ (6)
Note that, 1−q essentially is the probability that for any
pair of vertex u, v, there exist k internally-disjoint paths
of length 2 to connect u, v. A graph G is k-connected
if and only if for each pair u, v of vertex there exist at
least k internally disjoint u − v paths (a path with u, v
as ends) in G [26]. Hence, 1 − q is a low bound of the
probability that a graph is k − connected.
Thus, q is an upper bound of the probability that a
graph is not k-connected. If k = 2, q = (1 − p4)⌊(
N−2
2
)⌋.
The simulation of q with k = 2 as the function of network
size and p is shown in Figure 3. The simulation results
show that in ER network with small size and small p, it’s
still quite possible to find vertex with nontrivial damage
values. For example, when N = 3000 and p = 0.18, q is
20.7%, which is significant and can not be ignored.
As connected acyclic graphs, trees are 1 − connected
and vertex with degrees larger than 1 have nontrivial
damage values. The damage distribution of a tree is de-
termined by it’s structure. One extreme case of tree is
path (as shown in Figure 4(a)), where only two ends have
degree 1 and all other vertex have degree 2. A path
structure has a quite heterogenous damage distribution,
where for each damage value in [1, ⌈N/2⌉] there exists
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Simulation of probability q in Equa-
tion 6 with k = 2. q is a function of network size and connec-
tivity probability p. In this simulation, we vary the network
size from 1000 to 10000 with the increment of 100 to generate
91 samples.
1 12 3 3 2
(a)A path structure
(b)A star structure
FIG. 4: Two tree structures.
two vertices (when N is odd, only one vertex has dam-
age ⌈N/2⌉). The tree that has the most homogenous
damage distribution is a star, as shown in Figure 4(b),
where the vertex of largest degree has a extremely large
damage value, that is N − 1, and all other vertex have
damage 1.
In general, cycles may exist in real-world networks.
Hence, it’s hard to find real-world networks taking ex-
actly the form of tree. However, the structure of a real-
world network can be considered as the union of one of its
spanning tree and corresponding additional edges. In this
sense, many networks can be considered as tree-like struc-
ture. In general, if the structure of a network is closer to
tree, it’s of higher probability to find more vertex with
high damage value. To show this, we give the damage
distribution of four synthetic BA networks with m vary-
ing from 1.0 to 1.8 in Figure 5. Note that in the generic
BA network model, m is an integer. To produce tree-
like BA networks, we adjust the model to handle cases
wherem is a decimal in following ways: each time when a
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Damage distributions of tree-like net-
works. The networks are generated by BA network model
with m set as 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8.
new vertex arrives, we link it to ⌊m⌋ existing vertex with
probability q = m− ⌊m⌋ and link it to ⌊m⌋+ 1 existing
vertex with probability 1− q. When m = 1, the network
is a BA scale-free tree. When m becomes larger, the net-
work structure is farther away from the tree structure. It
is obvious from Figure 5 that when the network structure
is close to tree, long tail can be observed, indicating that
many vertex of large damage exist in the network.
C. Damage of real networks
In following texts, we will perform empirical analy-
sis on two real networks. One is airline transporta-
tion network of United States of year 1997 (denoted by
USAir) with vertex representing the airports of United
States and edges representing the airlines. There are
overall 332 airports and 2126 airlines. The other one
is protein-protein interaction network of yeast (denoted
by Yeast) with vertex representing proteins of yeast and
edges representing the interaction of proteins. Yeast
has 2361 proteins and 7182 interactions. The behav-
iors of these two networks under attack are critical for
the functionalities of these networks. The two network
data and their detailed descriptions are now available at
http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/data/.
As shown in Table I, the airport with the largest degree
in USAir is Chicago O’hare Intl, which has 131 airlines
connecting to other airports covering 39.5% airports of
US. However, its damage value is only 3, which means
that Chicago O’hare Intl is essential for only three air-
ports to connect to other airports. The airport with the
largest damage in USAir is Anchorage Intl, whose dam-
age is 27 implying that 26 airports rely on Anchorage
Intl as the transferring airport and Anchorage Intl is
their unique choice to connect to other airports. In other
TABLE I: Top 10 airports with the largest degrees.
Rank Degree Damage Vertex Name
1 139 3 Chicago O’hare Intl
2 118 15 Dallas/Fort Worth Intl
3 101 3 The William B Hartsfield Atlan
4 94 7 Pittsburgh Intll
5 94 6 Lambert-St Louis Intl
6 87 3 Charlotte/Douglas Intl
7 85 2 Stapleton Intl
8 78 4 Minneapolis-St Paul Intl/Wold-
9 70 1 Detroit Metropolitan Wayne Cou
10 68 7 San Francisco Intl
TABLE II: Top 10 airports with the largest damages.
Rank Degree Damage Vertex Name
1 29 27 Anchorage Intl
2 118 15 Dallas/Fort Worth Intl
3 14 12 Bethel
4 94 7 Pittsburgh Intll
5 68 7 San Francisco Intl
6 24 7 Honolulu Intl
7 94 6 Lambert-St Louis Intl
8 4 5 Guam Intll
9 78 4 Minneapolis-St Paul Intl/Wold-
10 60 4 Phoenix Sky Harbor Intl
words, if Anchorage Intl malfunctions, these 26 airports
will be isolated from the outside world if only air trans-
portation is considered. However, it is surprising to find
that Anchorage Intl ’s degree is 29 and corresponding de-
gree rank is only 41. Above analysis clearly shows that
the essentiality of an airport can be characterized by its
damage instead of degree.
The top ten airports with the largest degree are shown
in Table II. Comparing it to Table I, we find that only five
airports simultaneously occur in the two ranking lists. It
is interesting to find that some airports that are highly
connected, such as Chicago O’hare Intl, The William B
Hartsfield Atlan, have relatively small damage values. In
contrast, some airports with large damages, such as An-
chorage Intl, Bethel, Honolulu Intl, Guam Intll, Phoenix
Sky Harbor Intl, have quite small degrees. For example,
Guam Intll only connects to 4 airports but has damage
5, which implies that 4 airports completely rely on Guam
Intll to connect to the outside world. Consequently, de-
spite of its small degree, Guam Intll becomes the local
center of air transportation.
Among all the airports, Dallas/Fort Worth Intl not
only has a large degree but also has a significant dam-
age. Hence, Dallas/Fort Worth Intl is not only a popu-
lar transferring airports, but also a local center responsi-
ble for the connection of its local airports to the outside
world. Above facts together inspire us that damage has
its own right in characterizing the importance of a ver-
tex from the perspective to maintain the connections of
a vertex’s neighborhood to the outside world of the net-
work.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Correlation between degree and dam-
age for Yeast and USAir.
D. Correlation between damage and degree
Degree is the one of the most widely used measures to
characterize the importance of vertex. Whether degree
and damage has certain correlation, for example high de-
gree leading to high damage, is an intriguing problem. To
address issue, we will first study the correlation between
damage and degree for the two real networks analyzed
in previous sections. Then, we propose a network gener-
ation model to produce networks with arbitrary degree-
damage correlation.
The distributions of damage and degree for Yeast and
USAir are shown in Figure 6. It is visually apparent
that the majority of vertex tend to have small degrees
and small damages. However, in general, vertex of small
degrees do not necessarily have small damages. Many
vertex of small degrees but having larger damage exist
in Yeast, implying that the removal of vertex with small
degree may also have non-ignored influences on the in-
tegrity of Yeast.
More generally, there exists no essential correlations
between damage and degree for an arbitrary network,
which is verified by a network generation model that can
be tuned to produce networks with desired correlations
between degree and damage. The independence of dam-
age on degree strongly suggest that damage is a novel
perspective that can not replaced by degree to charac-
terize the property of vertex.
The network generation model is as follows: Suppose
that we need to generate a network with N vertex. We
first partition vertex set into two subsets V1, V2 with
N1 and N2 vertices, respectively, such that N = N1 +
N2. Then, we generate a graph (denoted by G[V1]) with
vertex set V1 such that any vertex in G[V1] has damage 1.
This objective can be achieved if G[V1] is k − connected
and k ≥ 2. BA network generator that uses a complete
subgraph as the seed network and at each step a newly
added vertex is attached to m ≥ 2 existing vertices can
help us generate a 2− connected G[V1].
In the second step, for each vertex u in V2, we will
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FIG. 7: Synthetic networks with desired correlation between
damage and degree. Each generated networks consists of 2000
vertex and 3500 edges with N1 = 1500 and N2 = 500. G[V1]
is generated by BA model with m = 2.
attach it to a vertex vi ∈ V1 of degree ki by probability
Π(vi) ∼
f(ki)∑
vi∈V1
f(ki)
(7)
, where ki is degree of vi in G[V1] and f(ki) is a function
of ki. In the resulting graph, any vertex vi in V1 has de-
gree ki + Π(vi)N2 and damage Π(vi)N2 + 1, while each
vertex of V2 has degree 1 and damage 1. Consequently,
we can generate a network stratifying desired correlation
between damage and degree by tuning f(ki). As an ex-
ample, we can generate graphs such that its correlation
between degree and damage is (1)Positive, (2)Negative,
(3)Independent by specifying f(ki) as:
1. f(ki) ∼ ki;
2. f(ki) ∼ k
−1
i ;
3. f(ki) ∼ ki mod µ, where µ is a large prime
, respectively. The correlation plots of networks gener-
ated by above parameters are shown in FIG 7. The fig-
ure shows that the network model can generate networks
with different correlations between degree and damage.
IV. DAMAGE ATTACK
Now, we are ready to give the detailed procedure of
damage attack: An informed agent always attempts to
deliberately attack a vertex with the maximal damage
value in the current network. After the malfunctioning of
the target vertex, simulated by the removal of the vertex,
the agent recalculates the damage value of each vertex in
the network. The attack continues until the destructive
objective is achieved. To comprehensively understand the
vulnerability of network under intentional attacks, it is
reasonable to assume that the attack will stop until the
network completely falls apart, i.e., the largest connected
component of the network contains only one isolated ver-
tex. Compared to degree attack, there are two distinctive
features in damage attack. First, vertex importance is
8measured by damage rather than degree. Second, recal-
culation is indispensable due to the sensitivity of damage
value to vertex removal.
A. Damage attack on real networks
We first show the destructive effect of damage attack
on a small hypothetical network with the comparison to
degree attack. For the graph shown in Figure 1, when
the vertex with the largest damage, i.e., u1, is removed,
Smax will fast decrease from 18 to 13. Compared to dam-
age attack, if the vertex with the largest degree, i.e., v1,
is removed, other vertex remain connected. When the
damage attack continues, u2 will be removed, which will
produce a network with only 9 vertex (half of the original
size). However, under degree attack, the target after the
removal of v1 is v2, whose removal has no effect on the
connectedness of the remaining 16 vertex.
Above example shows that damage attack is more de-
structive than degree attack, which is valid at least at the
early stage of the attack. Then, we may wonder whether
the superiority of damage attack is consistent across the
whole attacking process until the network completely falls
apart. To answer this question, we simulate the inten-
tional attack guided by damage and degree, respectively,
on two real networks used in previous sections. The re-
sult is shown in Figure 8. It is visually apparent from
the plots that for both the two real networks the de-
struction (measured by the decrease of Smax and average
inverse geodesic length l−1) caused by damage attack is
more significant than that caused by degree attack un-
til a cross-point is reached. Such facts sufficiently show
that damage attack is more destructive than degree attack
before the cross-point.
Specifically, for Yeast, before the fraction of vertex re-
moved reaches to the cross-point 15.01%, Smax under
damage attack is always smaller than that under degree
attack. However, after 15.01% degree attack shows more
efficiency than damage attack until the network com-
pletely collapses. It is approximately at fcd = 20.5%
(under degree attack ) and fcD = 21.1% (under damage
attack) that the network completely falls apart. If com-
plete destruction is the attacking objective, degree attack
shows minor superiority to damage attack, since fcD is a
little larger than fcd .
Note that at the cross-point 15.01%, Smax is less than
25% of the original size, which implies that at the cross-
point Yeast generally has already lost most of its func-
tionalities. Before the cross-point, when fraction of re-
moved vertex reaches to approximately 8.5%, maximal
extra destruction caused by damage attack compared to
degree attack is reached, which is about 9.7% of original
network size. The extra damage is significant enough,
since in many real networks, the network almost lost its
function when removing 9.7% vertex. In Yeast, supe-
riority of damage attack dominates the whole attacking
process since at the cross-point, 3/4 attacking process has
finished. All these facts together suggest that destruction
caused by damage attack is more significant and can not
be ignored in real applications. The fragility of Yeast un-
der damage attack also provides additional evidence for
the notion that damage characterizes the essentiality of
proteins in PPI networks [19].
Similar phenomenon can be observed from USAir net-
work. The results are shown in Figure 8(b). Before the
cross-point 14.45%, damage attack is more destructive
than degree attack. This result is consistent when the
network performance is measured by average geodesic
length, as shown in the inset of Fig. 8(b). When cross-
point is reached, Smax is only about 20% of the original
size, suggesting that network has been fragmented into
pieces. It is surprising to find that the maximal extra de-
struction of damage attack is 27.96%, which is obtained
when fraction of removed vertex reaches to 8.7%. These
facts strongly suggest that USAir network exhibits more
fragility under damage attack than under degree attack.
Note that in USAir fcD , approximately to be 92.17%, is
quite large compared to fcd = 34%. However, these indi-
cators are meaningless since after the cross-point the at-
tack is performed on a network with disconnected pieces
(note that Smax after cross-point is less than 20% of the
original network size).
B. Damage attack on synthetic networks
Next, we will show that previous observations on real
networks are consistent on synthetic networks including
ER networks and BA scale-free networks. Most of real
networks can be reproduced by these two synthetic net-
work models under suitable parameters. In this subsec-
tion, we generated an ensemble of BA and ER networks
(10 realizations, respectively) with the same parameters,
so that each performance quantity can be evaluated as
the average of 10 realizations.
The result on BA network is shown in Fig. 9(a). Exis-
tence of a cross-point (8.1%) of damage-attack curve and
degree-attack curve is obvious from the figure. Damage
attack still exhibits more destructive effect on BA net-
works than degree attack before the cross-point. It is
about at 5% that the maximal extra destruction caused
by damage (≈ 5%) can be reached before the cross-point.
After the cross-point, Smax under degree attack drops
faster than that under damage attack, yielding a small
fc d (≈ 14.3%) and relatively large fc D (≈ 17.6%). How-
ever, when using l−1 as the measure of network perfor-
mance, it seems that degree attack is more destructive
than degree attack along the entire attacking process (as
shown in the inset of Fig. 9(a)).
Similar results can be observed from ER networks,
with following distinctive observations. First, for ER
networks, the cross-point (22.2%) and the critical points
when the network completely falls apart (fcd ≈ 34.1%
and fcD ≈ 46.1%) under two attacks are significantly
larger than corresponding counterparts of BA network.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Intentional attacks guided by damage
and degree on real networks. The insets are the results of
degree attack and damage attack when network performance
is measured by average inverse geodesic length l−1 as defined
in Eq.(3).
Such facts suggest that ER networks are more robust
against intentional attacks including degree attack and
damage attack. In general, the integrity of ER network is
maintained by a majority of vertex with average degree.
In contrast, the integrity of BA network heavily relies
on the minority of vertex with largest degrees. Hence,
when adversaries deliberately attack the vertex with the
largest degree or damage in the network, BA network is
more fragile than ER networks.
Comparing the results on real networks and synthetic
networks, we find that damage attack seems to be more
effective on real networks than on synthetic networks. At
the cross-point the destructive effects on real networks
are more significant than that on synthetic networks
(both ER network and BA network). For real networks,
Smax at the cross-point lies in the range (20%, 30%);
0 5 10 15 20
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 10 20
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
50.5%
f
c_D
=17.6%
La
rg
es
t C
om
po
ne
nt
 S
iz
e
Fraction of vertex removed (%)
 Damage-Attack
 Degree-Attack
8.1%
f
c_d
=13.4%
Fraction of removed vertex(%)
A
ve
ra
ge
 in
ve
rs
e 
ge
od
es
ic
 le
ng
th
(a)BA Network
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
58.2%
f
c_d
=46.1%fc_d=34.1%
La
rg
es
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 s
iz
e
Fraction of vertex removed (%)
 Degree-attack
 Damage-attack
22.02%
A
ve
ra
ge
 in
ve
rs
e 
ge
od
es
ic
 le
ng
th
Fraction of vertex removed (%)
(b)ER network
FIG. 9: (Color online) Intentional attacks guided by damage
and degree on synthetic networks. Each value in the figures
is evaluated by the average on 10 realizations of BA (ER)
networks with the same parameters. The variance of the 10
samples is close to 0, thus being omitted in the figure. Figure
9(a) shows the result on BA scale free networks with N = 3000
and average degree < k >= 3.1. Figure 9(a) shows the result
on ER networks with N = 3000 nodes and < k >= 4.
whereas for synthetic networks, Smax varies from 50%
to 60%. In reality, when only 20% 30% vertex remain
in the largest connected component, the function of the
whole system is reasonably to be regarded as collapsed.
Hence, damage attack is really effective to destruct real
networks.
C. Summary
Comparatively empirical studies of damage attacks
and degree attacks on both real networks and synthetic
networks strongly suggest that:
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1. Real networks and typical synthetic networks are
quite vulnerable to damage attack;
2. The existence of a cross-point is a universe phe-
nomenon shared across a variety of diverse net-
works, when comparing degree attack and damage
attack with network functionality being measured
by Smax;
3. Damage attack is more destructive than degree at-
tack before the cross-point, at which a network gen-
erally has already lost most of its functionalities.
All these findings together show that damage attack
poses a great challenge for us to protect complex net-
works, hence deserving our research efforts.
V. ANALYSIS
Findings in the previous sections are not self-evident.
In this section, we will explore the reasonable explana-
tions for above results.
Note that, after the cross-point of degree attack and
damage attack, the decrease of Smax under degree attack
is faster than that under damage attack. For example,
for BA networks, under degree attack, 50.5% decrease of
Smax is caused by the removal of 13.4%-8.1%=5.3% ver-
tex, while under damage attack the same destruction is
caused by the removal of 17.6%-8.1%=9.5% vertex. Such
facts imply that the integrity of the remaining network
under degree attack at the cross-point is maintained by
only a minority of vertex, whose removal will cause fast
collapse of the network. Then, it’s reasonable to expect
that the network at the cross-point under degree attack
is more sensitive to the removal of some key vertex than
that under damage attack.
The sensitivity to vertex removals can be observed
from the damage distributions of the remaining networks.
Let Gd, GD be the networks at the cross point under de-
gree attack and damage attack, respectively. We sum-
marize the damage distributions of Gd, GD for Yeast and
USAir in Figure 10. As comparisons, the original dam-
age distributions are also given. Let P (D), Pd(D) and
PD(D) be the damage distribution of the original net-
work, Gd and GD, respectively. From Figure 10, we can
see that for both two real networks Pd(D) is more right-
skewed than P (D) while PD(D) is less right-skewed than
P (D), suggesting that PD(D) is more homogenous than
P (D) and Pd(D) is more heterogenous than P (D). Con-
sequently, Gd is more sensitive to degree attack than GD
to damage attack.
To give quantitative support, we use entropy to mea-
sure the heterogeneity of a damage distribution. The
entropy is defined as:
H(G) = −
∑
pi log pi (8)
, where pi is the probability that a vertex has damage i.
The larger H(G) is the more heterogeneous the distribu-
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FIG. 10: (Color online) Damage distributions of two real net-
works. (a) shows the damage distributions of the original
networks. (b) and (c) show the damage distribution of GD
and Gd, respectively. H in each figure is the entropy value
computed by Eq. (8).
tion is. The entropy values are also given in Figure 10,
which confirm that damage distribution of Gd is more
heterogeneous than GD.
Now let’s have a closer look at the damage distribu-
tions at the cross-point. For USAir, two airports ’Fort
Lauderdale/Hollywood Intl’ and ’General Mitchell Intll’
have damage value as 47, 49, respectively, in Gd. Note
that the damage caused by these vertex are significant,
since the airports isolated from the largest cluster of Gd is
approximately 15% of all airports. Hence, the integrity
of Gd heavily relies on the existence of these two air-
ports. However, it is surprising to find that both of these
two airports have only damage as 1 and degree as 34 in
the original network. This fact suggests that those ver-
tex of less importance (whatever quantified by degree or
damage) in the original network may become the most
important vertex in the remaining networks after a num-
ber of steps of attacks guided by degrees. Hence, one of
the most important characteristics of degree attack is the
emergence of potential important vertex. However, for
damage attack, the case is just the reverse: as the attack
continues, more vertex tend to have similar damage val-
ues, and consequently damage attack gradually degrades
into random attack.
To provide more quantitative evidences, we further in-
vestigate the evolution of damage distribution under de-
gree attack and damage attack. We capture six snap-
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FIG. 11: (Color online) Evolution of damage distributions un-
der degree attack and damage attack. (a) compares the dam-
age distributions when 50, 100 vertex removed under degree
attack and damage attack. (b) shows the entropy of damage
distribution as the function of number of removed vertex un-
der two attack strategies. The statistics is summarized from
a BA network with 3000 vertex and 4369 edges.
shots of the intermediate results under degree attack and
damage attack from a BA network (similar results can
be obtained from real networks tested in above sections
and ER networks). The result is shown in Figure 11(b),
which clearly shows that across the whole attacking pro-
cess the damage distribution under degree attack is con-
sistently more heterogenous than that under damage at-
tack. It seems that under damage attack, damage dis-
tribution converges to a constant level. To have a direct
feeling about the heterogeneity, the damage distributions
of three snapshots in Figure 11(b) are also given in Fig-
ure 11(a), which are consistent with the above results.
Now, it’s ready to explain why degree attack produces
networks with more heterogenous damage distribution
than damage attack. Note that, under degree attack,
more edges will be removed from the network compared
to damage attack when the same number of vertex are
removed. The consequence of this is the sparsity of the
resulting network. Compared to degree attack, damage
attack seems to be more destructive at the early attack-
ing stage since more vertices are isolated from the largest
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FIG. 12: (Color online) Average degree as the function of
fraction of vertex removed. The synthetic networks are the
same as that used in Figure 9. The result of synthetic net-
works is summarized as the average of 10 realizations with
the same parameters as previous experiments.
cluster, however the number of edges isolated from the
largest cluster generally is less than degree attack. Con-
sequently, when it comes to a critical point where the
accumulative effect of degree attack becomes significant,
the integrity of the network will collapse avalanchely.
To verify above conjectures, we summarize the aver-
age degrees (the ratio of edge number to vertex number)
for intermediate networks [28] under degree attack and
damage attack. The results of two synthetic networks
and two real networks are shown in Figure 12. For all
tested networks, under degree attack, the average degree
of an intermediate network is consistently smaller than
that under damage attack, indicating that degree attack
is more destructive in removing edges from a network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we first review existing attacking mod-
els with the objective to unify existing models. Then, we
systematically investigate damage and its distributions
in two typical real networks (USAir and PPI of Yeast)
and typical synthetic networks including BA networks,
ER networks and tree-like networks. We show that BA
network generated from a 2-connected seed network with
m ≥ 2 is also a 2-connected network. We also show that
vertex of higher damage tend to exist in a tree-like net-
work. Statistics about damages in two networks show
that damage has its own right in characterizing the im-
portance of a vertex in maintaining the connection of its
neighborhood to the outside world of the network, which
further suggests that as a measure of vertex, damage can
not be trivially replaced by degree or other measures.
We empirically analyze the behaviors of complex net-
works against damage attack with the comparisons to
12
degree attack. Our major finding include: There exists a
cross-point of degree attack and damage attack before
which damage attack is more destructive than degree
attack for a variety of diverse networks; Real networks
and typical synthetic networks are quite vulnerable to
damage attack since at the cross-point the network al-
ready lost most of its functionalities. Further investiga-
tion shows that degree attack tends to produce networks
with more heterogenous damage distribution than dam-
age attack, which accounts for the existence of the cross-
point.
All above findings together suggest that damage attack
is one of most potentially destructive attacks, deserving
further research efforts. The vulnerability of real net-
works and synthetic networks also poses a great challenge
for us to protect these networks. Results in this paper
may shed light on efficient solutions to protect complex
networks against damage attack.
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